
Top Secret

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: AUG 2004

(b) (1) (b) (3)



DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE


## WERKLY REVIEW

Top Secret

509

9 February 1968

72-228711/2



## C O N T E N T S

(Information as of noon EST, 8 February 1968)

Far East

	Page
KOREAN CONFRONTATION CONTINUES UNRESOLVED	6
The talks between North Korean and US representatives	
at Panmunjom appear to have made no progress toward resolving the <u>Pueblo</u> incident.	
•	

-TOP SECRET

Page i

WEEKLY REVIEW

•	TOP SECRET	

TOP SECRET

Page ii WEEKLY REVIEW 9 Feb 68

	TOP SECRET
•	

TOP SECRET

Page iii WEEKLY REVIEW

	• 1	TOP SECRET		10 mg
***				

9 Feb 68 Page iv WEEKLY REVIEW

			•	
•				
·	•			

## KOREAN CONFRONTATION CONTINUES UNRESOLVED

The talks between North Korean and US representatives at Panmunjom appear to have made no progress toward resolving the confrontation over the <u>Pueblo</u> incident.

Pyongyang is clearly intent on prolonging tensions by dragging out negotiations. North Korean propaganda has concentrated on publicizing "confessions" by the Pueblo's crew. A lengthening parade of officers and crewmen al-

legedly have expressed guilt and "apologized" for the ship's intrusion into North Korean waters.

The South Korean Government's initial dissatisfaction over US handling of the Pueblo incident soon broadened, with official encouragement, into widespread public resentment. The South Koreans feared the Panmunjom talks were ignoring the raid on Seoul and were pushing South Korean national

TOP SECRET

Page 6

WEEKLY REVIEW

## TOP SECRET

interests into the background. The press complained that the Panmunjom talks undermined South Korean sovereignty and elevated the status of the North Korean regime. Some politicians urged diplomatic pressure to stop the "secret" talks and demanded unilateral retaliatory action against the Communist North. The National Assembly unanimously passed a resolution protesting US - North Korean talks without South Korean participation.

Students have demonstrated at the US Embassy in Seoul, in Pusan, and near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Prior official hints that public agitation might lead to demonstrations suggest the government probably approved.

The South Korean leaders, however, realize the dangers to their
own position if popular emotions
get out of hand. They may also
now believe that the lack of progress at Panmunjom reduces the possibility the US might make compromises that would undercut Seoul.
Thus, after officially protesting
on 5 February, the government moved
to damp down public indignation.

A high-level spokesman assured press representatives on 6 February that President Pak has in fact been fully informed on the talks and that the assassination attempt against him had been discussed at one meeting. The next day while speaking to the National Assembly, the foreign minister conceded that discussion of the Pueblo crewmen's release might be given priority "from a humanitarian point of view." This change in official position has been reflected in the shift of the Seoul press to a more moderate stance.

Soviet military reaction to the Korean crisis is continuing on a low level. As US naval forces moved into the Sea of Japan, they were shadowed by two Soviet destroyers and an intelligence collection ship.

task force of five more Soviet destroyers was deployed in the Sea of Japan early this week in an afterthe-fact show of force. Soviet naval aircraft have conducted several reconnaissance missions--including overflights--against the US task force.

Soviet propaganda is playing the Pueblo incident in low key and Soviet officials have for the most part been maintaining that the Pueblo intruded into territorial waters. Moscow continues to emphasize that direct US - North Korean meetings offer the best chance for resolving the The most authoritative public statement on the crisis, a Pravda "Observer" article on 4 February, concluded by advising the US that if it really desired a solution it should respect North Korea's sovereignty and stop "threatening" the Koreans.

Since China's official statement of support on 28 January, Peking propaganda has given only sparse and low-level coverage to the <u>Pueblo</u> incident.

TOP SECRET

Page 7

WEEKLY REVIEW